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AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE USE AND USEFULNESS OF SECURITY
SO TWARE IN DETECTING COMPUTER ABUSE
William D. Nance
Detmar W. Straub
Curtis L. Carlson School of Management
University of Minnesota

ABSTRACT
Computer security remains an important issue in the management of organizational information
systems. Losses resulting from computer abuse and errors are substantial, and IS managers continue
to cite security and control as a key management issue. With continued expansion of clistributed data
processing and storage, the need to both prevent and detect violations also increases. This latter
aspect, detection of computer abuse incidents, is the focus of this study.

This empirical study examines the prevalence and sophistication of security software system installations across the United States. Using a victimization survey of 528 randomly-selected DPMA members, the study examines discovered incidents of computer abuse in organizations and attempts to identify relationships between comprehensive (i.e., sophisticated) security software and successful discovery

of abuse.
More comprehensive security software was found to be associated with greater ability to identify
perpetrators of abuse and to discover more serious computer abuse incidents. Larger organizations
used both a greater number and more sophisticated security software systems than smaller organizations. Wholesale/retail trade organizations used less comprehensive software than average, while

manufacturing organizations and public utilities used more comprehensive software. Surprisingly, no
relationships were found between the maturity of an organization's security function and the number

and/or sophistication of security software systems utilized.
1.

INTRODUCTION

increased detection activities (AICPA 1984) and through

appropriate punishment of perpetrators of abuse (Straub
Concerns over computer security continue to play an im-

and Nance 1987). Cumulatively, these findings suggest
that organizations with more proactive security functions

portant role in the management of organizational information systems. Losses resulting from intentional abuse
of computer systems appear to be substantial; in fact,
they have been described as "enormous" by the American
Bar Association (1984). The ABA survey reported total

significantly reduce their risk.
2.

STUDY CONTEXT

dollar losses from computer abuse of approximately $.5
billion per year in only 72 firms. Losses from unintentional misuse of systems, or error, further compound the
problem (Alavi and Weiss 1985). Evidence for the im-

As computerization of the workplace has progressed over
the last several decades, organizations have upgraded
their control systems (Manuel 1984; Walden 1985). Most
of these control systems tend to focus on deterrents (e.g.,
administrative policy statements) and on preventives, both

portance of security is also provided by the frequency
with which security and control is cited as a key management issue by I/S managers (Brancheau and Wetherbe

software-based (e.g., user ID/passwords) and non-software-based (e.g., physical security of computer re-

1987; Dickson, et al. 1984; Sprague and McNurlin 1986).

sources).

Because of heightened realization of the importance of
I/S security to organizational survival, research has been
growing on effective techniques for reducing abuse. The
picture which is emerging supports the intuitive notion
that internal controls and other forms of computer secu-

However, deterrent and preventive countermeasures are
not foolproof; abuse incidents occur and can only be discovered "ex-post facto.' The problem is that organizations tend to rely on normal systems controls and acci-

rity can minimize computer abuse. Policy statements and

dental discovery to detect abuses which slip through the
protective net. Straub and Nance (1987) report that only

an active security administration function, for example,
are believed to reduce the number of abuse incidents
(Straub 1986a). Deterrence is further provided through

one of six of abuse incidents is discovered by proactive
detection activities, possibly because detection activities

283

tend to be "fishing expeditions" and are not targeted

rity" (Simmons 1984), ranging from applications programs

enough to be successful. The contention is that "security
administrators should give increased attention to detection" (p. 27). Thus, a sound organizational computer se-

and databases to files, records, and fields (Everest 1986).
Detective software features are items such as transaction

curity strategy not only requires utilization of deterrent
and preventive countermeasures, but also requires a re-

tracking computer use activities (Squillace 1985; Clyde

log reports and audit trails used in monitoring and
1987).

pertoire of detective activities to uncover incidents which
slip through prior security nets.

The current study uses these characteristics to differentiate "system sophistication" based on the "comprehensiveness" of coverage provided by various types of software.
"Low" sophistication operating systems (OS) target secu-

The computer security model in Figure l depicts the pro-

cess of preventing and detecting computer abuse incidents. The primary objective of computer security is to
minimize undiscovered abuse through a combination of
deterrents, preventives, and detection activities. Many
potential perpetrators are deterred by administrative policics, employee training, and visible security functions.
Some abusers are not deterred, though, and their attempted abuse must be thwarted by preventives. If the

rity at the level of account and/or database/file access
control only; they provide basic recording of violation attempts (Downs 1984). "Mid-level" sophistication database

management system (DBMS) and fourth generation language (4GL) packages target access control at finer levels

of granularity, specifically records, fields, or statistical
summaries; they, too, provide relatively simple records of
unauthorized activities (Butterworth 1984; Everest 1986;

preventives work, the attempt is foiled. If the preventives
fail, however, detection is the last screen in attempting to

Van der Lans 1986). At a "high" level of sophistication,
specialized security software packages are comprehensive
systems providing both a wide range of access control

uncover abuses.
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capabilities, plus detailed "tracking" or transaction logs of
all activity taking place regarding system activity (Squil-
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OS-level controls are the predominant type of security
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software available, with generally optional security features built into nearly all mainframe and minicomputer
operating systems.
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FIGURE 1.

OS-level systems are primarily con-

cerned with file access control, using procedures such as
user ID and passwords, designation of read-write-deleteexecute capabilities, multiuser restrictions, and data encryption (Cashin 1986; Littman 1984). While focusing
primarily on access control, OS security systems may also
provide elementary detection features such as access vio-

Computer Security Model

lation logs. These logs note items such as date, time,
location, and number of attempted unauthorized accesses.

As noted in Figure 1, use of security software to detect
successful incidents of abuse, the last section of the
model, is the focus of the current study. More specifically, the study attempts to determine if comprehensive-

DBMS and 4GL systems typically work hand-in-hand, as

4GLs are used to access data stored within DBMSs.
Similar to operating systems, DBMS/4GL security features are also optional and primarily concerned with access control. However, DBMSs provide more fine-tuned
access controls than operating systems by providing user
access to pre-defined portions or "views" of the database,
restricting users' ability to update data or modify database
structures, and controlling simultaneous access (Van der
Lans 1986). With a DBMS configured to provide different users with different views, 4GL queries formulated to

ness of security software is a factor in successful detective

activities. Security software is certainly not a panacea for
all security problems and is not necessarily appropriate in
all situations and for all types of abuse. It may, however,

be helpful in improving detection in some settings. Thus,
this study attempts to determine the organizational factors associated with use of security software, and to deter-

mine the degree to which more sophisticated software
improves detection of abuse.

retrieve data can be checked against individual users' prespecified access rights. Once again, DBMS/4GL systems

3.

TYPES OF SECURITY SOFTWARE

are not limited to access control; they too can provide
simple detection features reporting attempted unauthorized accesses.

Security software provides both preventive and detective

features. Preventive software provides "access control,"
also known as "logical" or "programmed" controls, and
may operate at varying levels. Software systems, for ex-

Finally, speciah-zed sojhvare systems are packages written
for the sole purpose of providing security. This is clearly
in contrast with OS and DBMS/4GL software where se-

ample, can limit use to finer and finer "levels of granula-
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curity features are optional and ancillary to the primary
function of the software. As with other types of security

security software is utilized in organizations. Data on

software, specialized systems provide access and activity

associated with more or less comprehensive security software. Finally, data on relationships between software
sophistication and successful computer abuse detection
helps explain relationships between these two constructs.

sophistication, or quality, helps us to understand factors

restrictions. They are most commonly differentiated from

less sophisticated controls, though, by their advanced
transaction logging capabilities, which in turn provide
complete audit trails (Squillace 1985) and in-depth security violations reports (Clyde 198D. In granting computer
security personnel detailed information regarding the use

4.1 Prevalence

of computer resources, specialized software packages go
far beyond simple access control; they can also actively

How prevalent are security softweire systems in organiza-

monitor and fouow-up on access violations (Clyde 1987).

tions today and what organizational factors are associated

A plethora of specialized security packages exist. Two
widely used systems, both running on 1BM equipment,
are Resource Access Control Facility (RACF) and Access
Control Facility II (ACFII) (Cashin 1986). Many others
are also available for both IBM and non-IBM shops.

with the number of systems utilized in an organization?
The study addresses this question by evaluating whether

4.

the number of systems utilized is associated with a variety

of organizational factors. The following study questions
were asked:
Ql Is number of security software systems related to
organizational size as measured by:

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1.1 total assets of tho organization at all loca-

This study utilizes two basic constructs for assessing secu-

tions?

rity software installations in organizations, namely the
number and sophistication of systems utilized. As noted
earlier, active and visible security functions utilizing a

1.2 total assets at the respondent's location?

variety of security techniques seem to be a successful deterrent to computer abuse; such organizations can be con-

1.3 EDP budget at the respondent's location?

sidered to have more "advanced" security.

Within the

realm of security software, organizations utilizing both
more and more comprehensive systems are considered to
be more advanced than organizations with fewer and less
sophisticated systems.

Q2 Is number of security software systems related to
type of industry?

The intent of the current study is to attempt to determine

Q3 Is number of security software systems related to
maturity of the security function?

organizational factors associated with security software
utilization, and to evaluate whether more comprehensive

security software is associated with successful abuse detection. To accomplish this objective, the study asks

4.2 Sophistication

three general research questions:

1.

How sophisticated are security software systems used in
organizations today, and what organizational factors are
associated with the sophistication of these systems? To

How prevalent is security software in organizations
today and what organizational factors are associated

2.

with number of systems utilized?

address this question, sophistication of utilized systems

How sophisticated is security software used in organi-

was evaluated against the same organizational factors as
in the prevalence questions. The following study questions were asked:

zations today and what organizational factors are associated with the sophistication of these systems?

3.

04 Is security software sophistication related to organizational size as measured by:

What is the nature of the relationship between security software sophistication and discovery of computer
abuse incidents?

4.1 total assets of the organization at all locations?

These research questions address the status of security
software from two different perspectives: quantity and
quality. Within each of these questions, several more
specific study questions were asked in order to evaluate

4.2 total assets at the respondent's location?

4.3 EDP budget at the respondent's location?

factors associated with use of security software. Data on
prevalence, or quantity of systems used across the sample,

05 Is security software sophistication related to type of
industry?

increases our understanding of the frequency with which
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06 Is security software sophistication related to maturity
of the security function?

time, they are exposed to new systems and can be expected to implement a greater number of these systems
to handle specific aspects of security. In turn, as exposure to new systems increases, installed systems are likely

43 Discovery of Abuse

to be more comprehensive.

What is the nature of the relationship between sophistication of security software systems and discovery of computer abuse incidents? To address this question, sophis-

Finally, it has been discussed throughout this article that
a proactive approach to security is a successful deterrent
to computer abuse. 07 and 08 assess this relationship in

tication of security software systems was treated as an
independent variable and compared with two key aspects
of computer abuse incidents: ability to identify perpetrators and seriousness of the abuse (Straub and Nance
1987). As noted earlier, ability to detect abuse may be

connection with security software. While severity of
punishment imposed on perpetrators of abuse has been
shown to be a successful deterrent (Straub and Nance
1987), such punishments are predicated upon identifica-

tion of the perpetrators.

dependent upon available information detailing unauthorized activities. While OS and DBMS/4:GL security features may provide modest recording and reporting capa-

sophisticated software to make such identifications. Simi-

07 explores the ability of

larly, in attempting to target abuse detection activities,

bilities, it is expected that increased detail provided by

discovery of serious abuses should be a major objective.
Q8 evaluates whether more comprehensive security soft-

specialized software reports will facilitate more successful

ware is a useful technique in discovering such incidents.

detection. The following study questions were asked:

07 Does use of more sophisticated security software in-

5.

crease an organization's ability to identify the perpetrator of computer abuse incidents?

METHODOLOGY

5.1 Data Collection

08 Does use of more sophisticated security software increase an organization's ability to uncover more
serious computer abuse incidents?

Data for this study is part of a victimization database ob-

tained in a prior study of computer abuse and deterrent
measures (Straub 1986a). The survey instrument (see
Appendix) was validated via extensive field interviews
with 35 system professionals, interviews and questionnaire

4.4 Discussion of Study Questions

responses from a group of 88, and, finally, pilot study
responses from 170. A more detailed description of the

As noted earlier, one of the primary objectives of this
study is to add to the growing body of knowledge in the
field of computer security and abuse deterrence. Toward

overall validation process is found in Straub (1986b). The
validated survey was mailed out to randomly-selected
DPMA (Data Processing Management Association)
members in 1986. The sample base that resulted from
this study and the pilot group, with duplicates removed,
was 1,063.

this end, 01 and Q4 seek to determine whether associations between organizational size and use of advanced
computer security techniques extend into the realm of

security software. Larger organizations spend both more
time and money on computer security and EDP audit
activities than smaller organizations (Straub 1986a); it follows that they would also be more likely to use more
comprehensive security software.

Of the 1,063 respondents, 528 organizations reported

having some level of security commitment, determined by
total personnel hours dedicated to computer security exceeding zero (question 122). These 528 organizations
with active security were chosen as the sample base because security software is useful in detecting abuse only
to the extent that someone in the organization is actively
responsible for responding to reported violation attempts.

Another objective is to identify areas of vulnerability to
computer abuse in order to assist security administrators
in targeting abuse detection efforts. Q2 and Q5, there-

fore, examine differences between industries. Some
industries are expected to be more vulnerable to computer abuse (e.g., banking, merchandising) and may uti-

Finally, within these 528 organizations, 168 separate inci-

dents of computer abuse were reported. Each incident
was accompanied by a separate page containing questions
28-43, addressing various aspects of individual abuse incidents.

lize more comprehensive security techniques to cope with

this vulnerability. Individuals responsible for security in
industries found to be below average in utilizing security
software can be alerted to the situation.

To help understand underlying determinants of advanced
security, Q3 and Q6 evaluate whether use of more advanced security software is associated with maturity of the
security function. As security staffs gain experience over

5.2 Measures

Prevalence of security software was measured on questions 16 and 17 of the research instrument. Question 16
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assessed the number of OS and DBMS/4GL systems by

tions between variables were analyzed using Chi-square

requesting the number of "SECURITY SOFTWARE
SYSTEMS available and actively in use on the main-

contingency tables and Kruscal-Wallis tests of significance.

frame(s) or minicomputer(s) at this location." This study
used only the number actively in use. Question 17 measured the number of specialized systems by asking the
number of "SPECIALIZED SECURITY SOFTWARE
SYSTEMS actively in use (examples: ACFII and RACF)."

6.

Sophistication was also measured on questions 16 and 17,

DATA ANALYSIS

6.1 Analysis of Prevalence Questions

as organizations reporting use of multiple system types

were collapsed into a single ranked category. In order of
sophistication, from least to most comprehensive, the
categories were: 1) None, 2) Operating System, 3)
DBMS/4GL, and 4) Specialized Software. This collapsing of responses resulted in all organizations being
included in one and only one class since organizations
were placed in the sophistication category corresponding
to their highest ranked system.

In answering the first research question, frequency of security software use, 83 percent of the respondent organi-

zations reported having security software "actively in use."
Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondent organizations utilizing various types of security software. A surprising 17 percent utilized no security software at all.
Seventy-three percent employed security embedded in
operating systems software, 47 percent used security embedded in DBMSs and/or 4GLs, and 42 percent used
some type of specialized security package:

By not addressing the number of different types used, this
classification scheme is limited. For example, an organization using five separate OS, three DBMS/4GL, and no

specialized security software packages was classified as
less sophisticated than an organization using a single spe-

cialized package and no OS or DBMS/4GL systems.
However, since a single specialized system may well provide more extensive security than a multitude of OS and

80 -

OS

70 -

73%

60.

DBMS/4GL systems, this coding scheme probably accu-

50 -

rately reflects the comprehensive nature of such systems.

DBMS/4GL

-

40 -

47%

20 -

None

10 -

17%
FIGURE 2.

Sedousness of the abuse was measured by question 37,

sw
42%

30 .

Maturity of the organization's security function was derived from the difference between inauguration of the
security function (question 13) and the time of the data
collection.

Specialized

Organizational Implementations

which asked "In your judgement, how serious a breach of
security was this incident?" While more objective measures of dollar losses (questions 38 and 39) were available, there is evidence (Straub and Nance 1987; Straub
1986a) that dollar loss is not as valid a measure of abuse

Assuming that access control system implementations

seriousness as this subjective measure.

covary with hardware installations, this usage of OS security measures is to be expected. Virtually all organizations utilizing computers have operating systems security
modules, but not all necessarily employ either these OS
controls or more sophisticated systems.

Finally, identi cation of the perpetrator was measured by
question 43, a free-format question which read "Please
briefly describe the incident and what finally happened to
the perpetrators: Based on the responses to this item,

which were reasonably complete, successful identification

Turning to the results2 of the prevalence questions
(Figure 3), several mteresting pomts arise. First, positive
relationships between size and prevalence were found.
Organizational size, as a broad construct, is clearly associated with the number of security software systems utilized by an organization.

of perpetrators was coded as either yes or no.

53 Statistical Techniques

Second, no relationship was found between industry and

Statistical techniques used to analyze the data included
descriptive statistics and various measures of association.
Descriptive statistics provide insight into the overall frequency and sophistication of installed systems. Associa-

number of systems. Thus, no conclusions can be drawn
about the tendency of one industry to use more or fewer
security software systems than any other industry.
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Answer

Question

45 -

Specialized
SW

40 Ql

Is number of security software systems

42%

35 -

related to organizational size as measured

by:
1.1 total assets of the organization at

30 -

Yes

DBMS/4GL

all locations?
1.2 total assets at the respondent' s

25 Yes

24%

20 -

location?
1.3 EDP budget at the respondent's

17%

17%

10 -

location?

Q2

OS

None

15 Yes

Is number of security software systems

No

5.

related to type of industry?

Q3

Is number of security software systems
related to maturity of the organization' s
security function?

FIGURE 3.

FIGURE 4.

No

Results of Prevalence Questions

Izvel of Sophistication

The questions on software sophistication (Figure 5) discovered positive relationships between organizational size
and sophistication. Larger organizations tend to utilize
more sophisticated security software systems than smaller
organizations. Thus, as in the prevalence section, organizational size seems to be associated with system sophis-

Third, no relationship was found between the maturity of
the security function and the number of security software
systems utilized. This last finding is contrary to expectations. One would expect the number of security systems
to increase as the security function ages since maturity of
the function would bring increased exposure to security
software products and the opportunity to implement new
security procedures. One possible explanation of the
finding is that rather than simply accumulating new systems, organizations tend to rep/ace old systems with new
ones. In other words, as they gain experience, organiza-

tication.

Question

Q4

Answer

Is security software sophistication related
to organizational size as measured by:

4.1 total assets of the organization at

Yes

4.2 total assets at the respondent's

Yes

all locations?

tions may use better systems over time.

location?

6.2 Analysis of Sophistication Questions

4.3 EDP budget at the respondent's
location?

Yes

The second research question addressed the sophistication of security software used in organizations. Figure 4

Q5

Is security software sophistication

Yes

shows the distribution of organizations based on the
sophistication of their security software. Note that the

Q6

Is security software sophistication related
to maturity of the organization's security
function?

No

two anchors, "None" and "Specialized Software," contain
the same respective proportions of organizations (17 percent and 42 percent) as in the prevalence section above;
in fact, they contain the same actual respondent organizations. Collapsing multiple responses from an organization
into a sophistication ranking restricts the middle two classifications to organizations which have systems of no
higher sophistication than that type.

related to type of industry?

FIGURE 5.

Results of Sophistication Questions

One major difference between the sophistication and prevalence results was the significant relationship found bet-

ween industry and sophistication (Q5).

In particular,

wholesale/retail trade organizations were found to utilize
/ess sophisticated systems than expected, while public uti-

Thus, 17 percent of the respondent organizations utilized
on& operating system security features and another 24
percent used DBMS/4GL systems either in isolation or in
combination with OS security features. While 42 percent
of the organizations used specialized security software,

lities and manufacturing organizations utilized more sophisticated systems.

Once again, no relationship was found between maturity

only 7 percent used such systems in isolation; 35 percent
used them in combination with OS and/or DBMS/4GL

of the security function and security software sophistication (06). One would expect that as an EDP shop gains
experience and knowledge over time, its expertise would

systems.
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also increase and more comprehensive security tools and
techniques would be implemented. Surprisingly, this was

Currently, larger organizations tend to use more sophisti-

not supported; older shops were not found to be more
likely to use ore sophisticated mechanisms than newer

organizations. Wholesale and retail trade organizations,
and smaller organizations, utilize less sophisticated soft-

cated software, as do manufacturing and public utility

Organizations with less comprehensive security

shops. This implies that organizations do not necessarily

ware.

experience a "learning curve" in implementing security
measures, but can implement sophisticated software packages early in the process of developing a security func-

software need to realize that security software can, in the

right setting, be effective in addressing the computer
abuse threat.

tion.

One of the most interesting findings of the study was the
lack of association between the maturity of an organization's security function and the number and sophistication
of installed security software systems. It suggests that

63 Analysis of Discovery of Abuse Questions

The fmal research question addressed the relationship

organizations do not necessarily experience a "learning

between software sophistication and aspects of abuse dis-

curve" in implementing security measures. Rather, they
may be able to introduce advanced software early in the

covery. The results of the discovery of abuse questions,
shown in Figure 6, indicate that sophistication of security

process of developing a security function.

software is positive/y related to discovery of computer
It should be noted that there are significant ramifications
of moving rapidly into use of advanced security techniques. On the one hand, young security programs with
sophisticated tools may be able to match the level of protection of mature programs without sophisticated tools.
On the other hand, introduction of advanced security soft-

abuse.
Answer

Question

Q7 Does use of more sophisticated security software

increase an organization' i ability to identify

Yes

ware into young security environments may backfire
(Straub and Hoffer 1988). Unforescen organizational

the perpetrator of computer abuse incidents?
Q8 Does use of more sophisticated security software
increase an organization' s ability to uncover

Yes

repercussions could result from the fact that while these
systems are more sophisticated and comprehensive, they
are also more complex and may strain managerial resources. Moreover, if applied inappropriately, they may
be too restrictive and end up causing more problems than
they solve.

more serious computer abuse incidents?
FIGURE 6.

Results of Discovery of Abuse Incidents Questions

Perpetrators are more likely to be identified and serious

losses uncovered when more sophisticated software sys8.

tems are utilized. Specialized security software provides
elaborate security violation reports that identify suspicious
user activity and this may lead naturally to discovery of a
computer abuser (07). Serious abuse incidents also seem
to be related to sophisticated software, possibly because
users are more aware of the controls and are deterred
from abusing the system at more serious levels (Q8).

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The current study is part of an on-going stream of research into computer security and effective countermeasures to the computer abuse threat. Prior studies in this

stream have demonstrated that General Deterrence
Theory may be a useful starting point for future research

These findings are also in accord with another study

since certainty and severity of sanctions imposed on per-

(Straub 1986a) which found that prevalence of security
software lowered the rate of computer abuse in organiza-

petrators of abuse have been found to be successful techniques for curbing abuse. They have also noted the effectiveness of responses such as active security administrators, dissemination of administrative policies and proce-

tions.

7.

dures, and internal controls. The current study adds to
this growing body of knowledge by demonstrating the
usefulness of security software in detecting computer

DISCUSSION

abuse.

This study provides insight into the implementation of
computer-based control in organizations and raises a
number of implications for practitioners responsible for
implementing computer security measures. It supports

While the results here and elsewhere are highly suggestive, more research is still needed. Research on the organizational impacts of security software needs to readdress some of the issues raised in this paper by finding
new methods for testing findings, exploring new questions
in this general context, and utilizing other theoretical approaches to studying computer abuse.

the notion that organizations using "advanced" (i.e., more
and better) security software can exercise better control

over computer abuse. They can uncover more serious
incidents of abuse. They can also unmask more perpetrators.
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Regarding methodology, tests triangulating on the pheno-

menon with different methods are needed to affirm conclusions drawn to date. Security software research calls
for in-depth qualitative techniques to give us a fuller un-

derstanding of the nature of security administration.

Butterworth, P.

"Security-Minded System Design Can

Protect Data Bases." Electronics, March 8, 1984, pp. 136-

140.

Cashin, J. "As Systems Spread Out Data Becomes Vul-

Similarly, experimental techniques would increase our

nerable." Sofware News, December 1986, pp. 40-48.

In addition, other questions need to be asked. For ex-

Systems: Fourth Insider Threat Identification System Con-

understanding of causal relationships.

ample, how should security software be administered on a
day-to-day basis? How does security software impact
worker productivity? What other organizational repercussions may occur? These and other relevant areas need

Clyde, A.

"Insider Threat on Automated Information

ference, August 1987, Bethesda, MA.

Cohen, 1. Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral
Sciences. New York: Academic Press, 1969.

further study.

Dickson, G. W.; Leitheiser, R. L.; Wetherbe, J. C.; and
Finally, new theoretical bases may prove useful to subsequent computer abuse research. Sociological theories of

deviance, for example, may help explain underlying causes
of individuals' abusive behavior. Psychological theories
may aid the study of individuals' responses to organizational efforts to reduce abuse.

At · a broader organiza-

tional level, organizational and/or economic risk theories
may help explain organizational reluctance to take steps
towards implementing security measures.

9.

CONCLUSION

While security software does not solve the computer
abuse problem, it is a step in the right direction. Computer security techniques need to keep pace with the

rising proficiency of computer users. Security software
can be an integral part of these activities. Advanced sys-

Nechis, M. "Key Information Systems Issues for the 80's:
MIS Qua,fer<y, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 1984, pp. 135-

159.

Downs, D. "Operating Systems Key Security with Basic
Software Mechanisms." E/ectronics, March 8 1984, pp.
122-127.

Everest, G. Database Management Objectives, System
Functions, and Administration. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1986.

Littman, J. "Tile Security Challenge." PC Week, November 20, 1984, pp. 67-77.
Manuel, T. "Computer Security." Electronics, March 8,
1984, p. 121.

tems provide access restrictions that prevent unauthorized
misuse as well as thorough tracking and reporting capabi-

Simmons, R. "An Overview of Computer Security." IBM
Systems Jouma4 Vol. 23, No. 4, 1984, pp. 309-325.

ventive net.
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Total percentages exceed 100 percent because many
organizations reported using more than one type of
security software system and were thus included in
multiple categories.
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relationship is not statistically significant. The study's
large sample size, moreover, provided power in ex-

cess of .97 on all tests. This exceeds the .80 level
which Cohen (1969) suggests as sufficient to test
medium-sized effects, the pragmatic effects a researcher is usually seeking. As a result, where a relationship was found, there is a high probability than
a relationship does, in fact, exist. Similarly, a "no"
response indicates that we can state with some confidence that no relationship exists.

APPENDIX
Section t.

Computer Abuse Questionnaire
Personal information

3. NUMBEROF TOTAL YEARS EXPERIENCE IN/WITH
INFORMATION SYSTEMS?
0 More than 14 years

0 11 to 14 years
O 7 to 10 years

1. YOUR POSITION:

0 3 to 6 years

0 President/Owner/Director/Chairman/Partner
0 Vice President/General Manager
0 Vice President of EDP
0 Director/Manager/Head/Chief 01 EDP/MIS
0 Director/Manager of Programming
0 Director/Manager of Systems & Procedures

0 Director/Managerof Communications
O Director/Manager of EDP Operations
0 Director/Managerof Data Administration

Organizational Information
4. Approximate ASSETS and annual REVENUES of your

organization:

REVENUES

ASSETS
Atal[

Mau

Althis

0

0

O

0

0

0 Senior Systems Analyst
0 Systems/Information Analyst
0 Chief/Lead/Senior Applications Programmer
0 Chief/Lead/Senior Systems Programmer

0

0

...100 Million-250 Million...

0

0

O Chief/Lead/Senior Operator
0 Machine or Computer Operator

0

0

0

0
0

.....250 Miltion-1 Billion....

0

0
0

O Systems Programmer

1 Biltion-5 Billion .....

. . . . . .

O

0 Applications Programmer

.......Over 58,Ilion.......

0

. . . .

50 Million-100 Million . . .

. . . .1 0 Mitlion-50 Million

. . . .

5 Million-10 Million

....

. . . . .

. . . . .2 Million-5 Million
. . . . . 1 Million-2 Million . ....
. . . . . . Under 1 Million . . . . . .
.........Not sure.........

0

0
0

00000000000

0 Data/Computer Security Officer

A: this

Locat,ons location

Locations location

00000000000

0 Director/ Manager of Personal Computers
O Director/Manager of Information Center
O Data Administrator or Data Base Administritor

0 Less than 3 years
0 Not sure

0 Vice President of Finance

O Controller
O Director/Manager Internal Auditing or EDP Auditirr
O Director/Manager of Plant/Building Security

2.500-4.999

0 Educator

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.000-2,499
750-999..

0 User of EDP

SOO-749..

0 Other(please specify):

250-499..
100-249..
6-99

Fewer than 6
Nk* sure .

2. YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISORS POSITION:

0 PresidenUO*ner/Director/Chairman/Partner
O Vice President/General Manager

6. PRIMARY END PRODUCTOR SERVICE<*youro,ganizationat
this location:

0 Vice Presidentof EDP

O Director/Manager/Head/Chief of EDP/MIS

O Manufacturing and Processing

0 Director/Managerof Programming

0 Chemical or Pharmaceutical

O Government Federal, State. Municipal includir:g Military

O Director/Managerof Systems & Procedures
0 Director/ManagerofCommunications
O Director/Managerof EDPOperations

0 Educational: Colleges Universities. and other
Educational Institutions
O Computer and Data Processing Servicesincluding
Software Services, Service Bureaus, Time-Sharing
and Consultants
O Anance: Banking. Insurance, Real Estate. Securities,
and Credit
0 Trade: Wholesale and Retail
0 Medical and Legal Services

O Director/Manager of Data Administr,tion
0 Director/Manager of Personal Computers
O Director/Managerof Information Center
O Data/Computer Security Officer
0 SeniorSystems Analyst
0 Chief/Lead/Senior Applications Programmer

0 Chief/Lead/Senior Systems Programme
O Chief/Lead/Senior Machine or Computer Operator
0
0
0
0

00000000000

0 Consultant

00000000000

0 EDP Auditor
0 Internal Auditor

5. NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES of *ur organization:
A: OWS
At alt
Locitions Location
10.000 or more .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.000-9.999

O Petroleum
0 Transportation Services: land, Sea, and kir
0 Utilities: Communications. Electric, Gas, and
Sanitary Services
0 Construction, Mining. and Agriculture
0 Other(please specify):

Vice President of Finance
Controller
Director/Manager Internal Auditing or EOP Auditing
Director/Manager of Plant/Building Security

Are you located at Corporate Headquaders: Yes 0

0 Other (please specify):
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No 0

7. CITY (al this location)?

17. Other than those security software systems you listed,n

STATE?

question 16. how many SPECIALIZED SECURITY SOFTWARE
SYSTEMS are actively in use? (Examples. ACFII. RACF)

8. TOTAL NUMBER OF EOP(Electronic Data Processing)
EMPLOYEES at this location (excluding
data input personnel):
0 More than 300
O 250-300
O 200-249

0 50-99
010-49

0150-199

0 Not sure

(numbef of $¢rcial,ted wcur,Ay 50 4¥*,e evuems acl,b*41 in use}

Olthest. howmany were purchased lroma vendo,? (Aumber purch,$ed Worn, Injor)

O Fewer than 10

.. and how many were developed,n·house?

0100-149

(Iumber developed i., rouse)

9. Approximate EDP BUDGET per year of your organization
at this location:
O Over $20 Million
O $ 10-$20 Million

18. ThroughwhatiNFORMATIONALSOURCESarecomputersystem

users made aware OF THE APPROPRIATE AND INAPPRO

O $2-$4 Million
O $1-$2 Million

PRIATE USES OF THE COMPUTER SYSTEM?
(Choose as many as ipplicable)

O Under $ 1 Million
0 Not sure

O $8-$10 Million

0 $6-$8 Million
0 14-$6 Million

0 Distributed EOP Guidelines

0
0
0
0
O
0
0
0

Computer Security. Interrul Audit,
and Abuse Incident Information

A Computer Security function in an organization is any purpose ful activity that has the objective of protecting assets such
as hardware. programs, data. and computer service from lossor

misuse. Examples of personnel engaged in computer security
functions include: data security and systems assurance officers.
For this questionnaire, computer security and EDP audit func-

19. Which types of DISCIPLINARY ACTION do these informational sources mention (question 18) as consequences
of purposeful computer abuse?

tions will be considered separately.

(Choose as manyas applicable)

Com-

0 Reprimand

EDP
Aueil

Sealrity

10. How many staff members are
nirlcirW 20 hours per week or more
in these functions atthislocation?

Administrative program to classify information by sensitivity
Periodic dep,4,nental memosand notes
Distributed statements of professional ethics
Computer Security Violations Reports
Organizational meetings
Computer Security Awareness Training sessions
Informal discussions
Other (Please specify):

0 Probation or suspension

O Firi.

0 Criminal prosecution
0 Civil prosecution

-(number - (rumbef
d per**S)
4 Penorn)

0 Other (please specify)

11. How many staff members are
working 19 hours per wtek or less in
-(number -(number
these functions at this location?

lowingstatements

12. What are the tot,1 personnet hours

20. The airrer* cor,(der lecurity

d Der=)

of per,crs)

per week dedicated to these

functions'

Suor/9
Agree Agree

Not

Sure

O'Ugree -

eNO,twasinreactionin Nge

-1-

ovt b actuator suspected past

aotai

('*81

t w ,43

13. When were these functions
initiated?

In questions 20-24, please indicate your reactions to the toi-

rodet d Cch,v.AV at,-Me M

hsurb.1,04

-1-

ea locatio4

000

0

0

0

0

0

0

21. Theacivitiescfcornouter
secL,ity admi<Btrators are.111

1,-n lousers at thts locatic,L

(morth/,4

0

22. The p.,Sence arld acth*ties of

cort**r security administra·
lors deter an»,e v'ho mtcht

If your answer to the Computer Security part ofquestion 12 was

zers. please go directly to question 25. Otherms€. cor,tinut
14. Of these total computer security personnel hours per week
(question 12), how many are dedicated to each of the
following?

abuse the corri#YAer sys:em *t
evs kx,4,0,1

23. Reativetocurtype€*ndustry
cor'px*er secur*yis -4

<¢fect,%*eattfus loczterl

0

0

0

0

0

O

0

0

O

0

0

0

0

0

0

24. Thcovvilisecisityphil©scohy
K this loc,t;or is to prmide

A- Physical security administration, disaster
recovery.and contingency planniN . . . . - (hours/week)
B. Data security adrninistration .......... -(hours/*mk)

C. Userandcoordinatortraining

(hourE/week)
.. - (hours/week)

O. Other

..ry tight sectriey welout
hir-1, protuclv*y.

25. How many SEPARATE UNAU™ORIZED AND DELIBERATE
INCIDENTSOFCOMPUTERABUSEhasyourorganizationat
this location experienced in the 3 year period, Jan. 1, 1983

(please specify)·

Jan. 1,1986?

15. EXPENDITURES per year for computer security at this

(number of incidents)

location:
(Please fill out a separate ··Computer Abuse incident Repor

Annual Computer security personnel ulanes .

[Blue-co#ored Section ti] for each incident)

00 you have insurance (separate policy or rider)

specifically forcomputer security losses?

0 Yes

0 No

ONot sure

[f yes. what is the annual cog of such insurance . . .

26. Ho¥¥ many incidents do you have reason to suspect other
than those numbered above in this same 3 year period. Jan.

1,1983-Jan. 1,1986?

i

(number of suspected incidents)

16. SECURITY SOFTWARESYSTEMS zvailableand actiuly m use

on the mainfrarne<s) [or minicornoltter(s)] at this location:

27. Please briefly describe the basis (bases)for these

suspicions.

Nu.rter 04 Numbe. d

i= ,<32
Operating system access contiol facilities.
DBMS security access controlfacilities . . . . .

fourth Generalion soft ware access
Control facilities.......
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Section 11.
Computer Abuse Incident Report
{covering the 3year period, Jan. 1. 1983-jan I. 1986)

Instructions: Please fill outa separate report foreach incidentof computerabusethat hasoccurred inthe

3 yearperiod,

Jan. 1,1983-Jan. 1,1986
36. If the incident had been going on for a period of time
how long was that?

28. WHEN WAS THIS INCIDENT DISCOVERED?

/

Month/year -

-

years

29. HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE INVOLVEDin committingthe
computer abuse in this incident?

:nonths

37. In your judgment. how serious a breach of security was
this incident?

(number of perpetrators)

(Choose one only)

30. POSITION(S) OF OFFENDER(S):

Main

Second

Oflender

Offender

0

0

Top executive

O Extremely serious
0 Serious

0 Of minimal importance
0 Not sure
0 Of negligible importance

Secunty o«ker

0

Auditor

0

Controller

O

0

Manager. s u p e r v i s o r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Systems Programmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Data entry staff
Apolications Programmer . .............
. ..........

0
0

0
0

Systerns anatyst........

Machine or computer operator...

38. Estimated $ LOSS through LOST OPPORTUNITIES of
measurable): (Example: $3,000 in lost business
because ofdata corruption)

00
0
0
0

1

(estimated $1oss throughlostooportunities)

0

0

0

0

39. Estimated $ LOSS through THEFT and/or RECOVERY

Student .

0

0
0

embezzied pius $1.000 in salary to recover from
data corruption + $2.000 in legal fees = $15.000)

Not sure.

0
0

0
0

Other EDP staff
Accourrtant..

Clerical personnel.....

0

Consultant
Other...

COSTSfromabuse: (Example:$12,000 electronically

0·

40. This incident was discovered._

Blease specity): (Main)

(Choose as manyas appticabie)
0 by accider* by a system user
0 by accident by a systems st,11 memberoran

(Second)
31. STATUS(ES) OFOFTENDER(S)
when incident occurred

Emploree.....

....................

··--···········.

Ex-efr,Oloyee....
Non-employee . .
Nd sure.

Other

t

(estimated $ loss throughtheft and/or recovery costs)

M.*
Offender

Second
Offender

internal/EC)P auditor

0
u
0

0 through a computer security investig,tion other
thaninaudit
0
0 blaninternal/EDPaudit
0
0 through normal systems corlrots. like software or
up,ocedural cor,trots
0
0 by ane,ternal audit

0

0

0

0 notsure
0 other (please specify):

(please specify): (Main)

(Second)
32. MOTIVATION(S) OFOFFENDER(S):

Ignoranceof proper professional conduct..

Personal gain

Misguided playfulness ...............
Maliciousness or reb,rge .............
Notsure..

Other

........................

Main
Offender

Offender

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 =neoneoutsidethe local orginiation
0 not sure

41 Ifthis incident was reported to someone outside the

0

localorganization. who was that?

(Choose as many as aoolicable)
0 someone,1 drvisional or cocporate headquarters
0 the media
0 the police

Mleasespecify): (Main)

(Second)

33. MAJOR ASSET AFFECTED or involved:

0 other authorities

(Chooseas miny as appticable)

0 notsure

0 Unauthorized use of corneuter seA·ice

43. Please briefly describe the incident and what finally

O Disruptio n 01 comouter service

happened to the perpetrator(s).

0 Data
0 Hardware
0 Proiums

34. Wasthisa one-timeincider,tochad it beengoingon fora
period of time?__
(Choose one only)

0 one-time event
0 goir on for a period d time

O not sure

35. If a one.tirne incident. WHEN DID IT OCCUR?
Month

41. This incident was reported to(Choo$eis manyas .pplic.ble)
0 Gorneone insidethelocalofganization

Year
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